Friday, August 6, 2010

On the readily apparent as evidence of existence or non-existence:


While denying sense data is impractical, it would be equally impractical to deny the existence of a potential object or even a fantastic object when there is evidence to support it or when there is no evidence to the contrary. This is the basis of what I will call healthy scepticism.

Healthy scepticism is to be distinguished from unhealthy scepticism by the fact that it does not deny what is readily apparent. In order to illustrate unhealthy scepticism, I refer to a legend of an early sceptic, who upon adopting scepticism of even what is readily apparent was killed by a cart when he walked in front of it, disbelieving its existence. Conversely, healthy scepticism operates upon the assumption (but not the certainty) that what is readily apparent is evidence to its own existence by its being apparent in the first place. I say that it does not operate on a certainty because, while it is impractical to disbelieve what is readily apparent, it is equally impractical to believe that what is readily apparent is objective truth (more on that another time). 

Likewise, it is illogical to believe in what is not readily apparent, or in what is apparently not. The former - what is not readily apparent - is merely name given to the potential for either existence or non-existence, while the latter - the apparently not - is made readily apparent by the absence of evidence and cannot be verified by any available means.

What is not readily apparent cannot be used as substantive evidence for the existence or potential existence of anything. Only what is within the immediate reach of human experience is readily apparent, and effective in evidencing the existence of a thing.

In cases where something is not readily apparent, it is best to reserve judgment (as I may yet argue is best in all cases), however it is not within human capacity to continue to be active in life without behaving as though what is apparent is real, and what is not immediately apparent could be real – regardless of whether it is believed true. That said, one should neither believe that the apparently not is categorically true or false either. Even so, reaction or no reaction to a lack of stimuli is not required for active life.

Next Week: We'll see...



...

Thursday, July 29, 2010

On what is readily apparent:

Having explained the infinite thing at length - a thing not readily apparent (and indeed, not likely perceivable) - it strikes me that it is necessary to illustrate what is not apparent by explaining its application to what is readily apparent; what is perceivable.

All that is ‘given’ to the perceptual doors (the senses), and is readily apparent without the aid of tools or theoretical equations, lies within the world or realm of perception. These are empirical perceptions. What is perceivable is shared to varying degrees by all sensitive humans. Anything that is perceived by one person can, under the similar circumstances be perceived by another person (for there can be no same circumstances). While we can’t quantify the perceptions of others, the acknowledgement of shared sensations allows for inferred empirical perception.

Generally, what is readily apparent is that which has the capacity to be discovered by human means, through the senses, or with tools (like a microscope). It is impractical to deny what is readily apparent, as that would deny the senses, which in turn would deny the realness of the real.

There are two ways of being readily apparent. Something can be apparently so, and apparently not. Both are readily apparent, but the latter can be used as evidence of existence, while the latter can be used as evidence of non-existence.

Next time: On the readily apparent as evidence of existence or non-existence, in which I explain
the concept of 'healthy scepticism.'

Thursday, July 22, 2010

Conclusions on Eternal Recurrence:


Obviously, because common interpretations of eternal recurrence don’t consider there to be infinite events, no proponent thereof makes any attempt to reconcile the two. Why should they? There is no empirical evidence that events are infinite (my a priori proofs that space and time, and therefore events are infinite are not empirical, obviously). My best attempt at reconciling the two is to take the expression ‘history repeats itself’ seriously.

While I cannot admit that any event can be the same as another without occurring at the same time, I can admit that some events are so similar as to indicate a loose concept of sameness (but not true identity). For example, the method in which I brush my teeth is generally the same across time. I brush them in a certain way, at a certain time of day, and it takes about the same amount of time every time. There will be deviations in certain circumstances, but it would not be inaccurate to argue that the history of my tooth brushing has repeated itself so often as to produce at least two events that are essentially the same apart from the time at which it occurred (from my human perspective). There is more to eternal recurrence theory that cannot be accounted for in that interpretation, however.

While Nietzsche didn’t believe that explanation, it is believed by Walter Kaufmann - a frequent translator and editor of his work - that eternal recurrence as Nietzsche conceived of it may have been derived from the works of Heinrich Heine, who wrote
“[T]ime is infinite, but the things in time, the concrete bodies, are finite. They may indeed disperse into the smallest particles; but these particles, the atoms, have their determinate numbers, and the numbers of the configurations which, all of themselves, are formed out of them is also determinate. Now, however long a time may pass, according to the eternal laws governing the combinations of this eternal play of repetition, all configurations which have previously existed on this earth must yet meet, attract, repulse, kiss, and corrupt each other again...” [my emphasis]

My reading of this quote seems to cohere well with the ideas I’ve been explaining since the beginning: the infinite has finite parts, and following from that, infinite time yields an infinite number of finite events, or, in a much broader sense, one infinite event.

Heine’s description of repulsion, kissing, and corruption is nice and flexible. It doesn’t say explicitly imply exact repetition, rather, it is a more poetic way of saying “stuff interacts and interrelates, and will continue to do so, in much the same way as it always has,” wherein “stuff” refers to events and event-objects.


Next Week: I don't know. We'll see, huh? I've sort of run out of steam in terms of the logical progression of this philosophy. It looks like the next big topic will be death-related! Exciiiting!

Friday, July 9, 2010

Eternal recurrence vs. Infinite events:

Required Reading: Eternal Recurrence,Time's Arrow

[Note: This used to be a longer essay (by blog standards), so I've cut it in two. Stay tuned for the second half next week, and may your existential concerns about the inexplicable and irreconcilable be assuaged at some point.]

The most common interpretation of eternal recurrence is flawed in that it assumes that there are a finite number of events within an infinite time. (It is assumed of eternal recurrence that events must recur the same way ad infinitum because there are a finite number of events within infinite time). This is not possible, because infinite time entails infinite events. It is already established that identity of events depends, particularly in cases of the most complex events, almost intrinsically on the time at which the event occurred. The more time there is, the more events there must be. If time is endless, the number of finite events throughout time must also be endless.

There are, I believe, an infinite number of events, objects, non-objects, and object-events housed within infinite space (I know that such a wording implies the finite. Just roll with it). As such, the universe and time as we know them cannot recur in exactly the same way because:

(a) time has no end, and therefore each event, no matter how similar is unique due to its having to have occurred at some point within the infinite; 
(b) time’s arrow denies the possibility that events could recur in the same way, because additional variables affect the universe ad infinitum (read: there is no limit to progress);
(c) the universe is in a state of constant flux. For the most part, this is because of (a).

However, as I write this, I can conceive of possible refutes that will need to be explored:

1. Identity of events with reference to placement on a timeline depends on an arbitrary conception of time as having units. Infinite time, as I have stated, is infinitely divisible, but is also an infinite unity. One cannot divide infinite time into two times, there is but one time, in which arbitrary divisions are imposed, but they are not true divisions. This suggests that what would commonly be referenced as time1 cannot be distinguished from time2, because it is part of a unity. As the increments imposed upon time are a man-made conception, the idea of one time following another is also a human conception, and as time is a unity, it is entirely reasonable to assert that all events as we perceive them are simultaneous – that is, one infinite (and infinitely divisible) time, in which one infinite (and infinitely divisible) event occurs. That said, the infinite event is infinitely divisible into finite increments, just as time is, which allows us the illusion of unique events. In all, though, this argument does not fully refute my initial argument, as the infinite nature of both time and the event preclude any definitive start or end point at which events can recur.
2. It is commonly theorized and/or prophesied that earthly (a very limited scope, in terms of universe, by the way) progress has reached - and will on several future occasions – reach points of stagnation and even regression. Arnold J. Toynbee, for example theorized that a human over-focus on the successes of the past will create stagnation by leaving humans unprepared to deal with future problems. The point being both that human progress is limited to the availability of those resources to them, and that past and future projections of technological stagnation are an example of the way in which eternal recurrence can be interpreted more loosely as ‘history repeating itself.’ It is not necessarily the case, however, that progress cannot occur after or even during a period of stagnation, to reach or overcome the level it had been at prior to that period. Likewise, as stated in (a) and noted in (1), identity of events does not allow for history to repeat itself exactly, as eternal recurrence would require. That is to say that eternal recurrence, as it is commonly conceived, cannot be possible if there are an infinite number of unique events.



Next Week: Conclusions on Eternal Recurrence, in which I provide a bit of denouement on this issue, and uneasily put it to bed.

Thursday, June 24, 2010

On time and eternal recurrence:

Required Reading: Eternal Recurrence, Linear and Cyclical Time

Eternal recurrence is a concept derived from Nietzsche. It was unfortunately underdeveloped because the most complete description of it is found in a collection of notes titled The Will to Power, which was released (and liberally edited) posthumously by his sister. As such, followers of Nietzsche have attempted to interpret and disentangle the concept in a faithful way, based on prototypical appearances in earlier works and the fragments found in the notes – an effort made difficult by the vagueness and sometimes contradictory nature of those mentions.

The premise of the theory is that all events (and the objects and beings involved), recur in exactly the same way an infinite number of times. In eternal recurrence time is cyclical rather than linear. All bodies and events will occur again in exactly the same way an infinite number of times because the past and future are practically the same as the present, due to the uniformity of the cycle.

Because it is the most familiar analogue, many seek to liken eternal recurrence with reincarnation. This is not the case in any familiar way. In Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, it is not a new life lived and there is no retention of prior consciousness (though, there is little information provided, with respect to that angle of approach).

Nietzsche used eternal recurrence as a way of showing that life-acceptance was important, in contrast with looking toward some future reward in a promised afterlife at the expense of putting any value into this life. He called this self-acceptance amor fati, or ‘love of fate.’ The problem, however, is that the frame of reference for what is past and what is future is always based in the present – which I have shown to be elusive and asymptotic.

While both Nietzsche and I assume infinite time, his cyclic time incorrectly assumes a finite number of events - an assumption that makes it difficult to reconcile eternal recurrence with the idea of the infinite thing. Despite the admission that all things are finite divisions within the infinite, forgetting that the number of finite divisions is infinite causes many problems.



Next Week: Eternal recurrence vs. Infinite events, in which I make a rather lengthy attempt to address the issues involved in reconciling the one with the other. (It may end up being a two-parter).

Friday, June 18, 2010

On Asymptotes and Matter:

Required reading: Asymptotes, On Events, On the paradox of infinite divisibility

"Approaching zero" refers to a mathematical concept involving parabolas and curves. An asymptote is a theoretical line which the curve always approaches, but never intersects with, such that if the line were to have a value of zero*, the curve would always approach, but never reach it. Similarly, nearly every quality or attribute has the capacity to “approach zero,” but never reach it.

Asymptotes in parabolic mathematics are examples of how infinite divisibility is a universal trait in a real-world context. The curve never reaches zero because it is dividing the space between the two infinitely. Metaphorically speaking, human experience is the curve, while exact time or exact location is the asymptote. Our curve of experience naturally approaches an exact time or an exact space, but never meets it.

The asymptotic nature of matter (and time) in conjunction with infinite divisibility necessitates that no one particle of matter (or time) can be truly pinpointed. The problem is that it appears as though experience approaches empirical (or objective) reality, but never reaches it. The evidence of reality is made so transitory by its divisibility. The result is that existence and infinite divisibility seem to imply non-existence by the impossibility of making true “this object exists at location x at time t.” This is to say that events/objects cannot be said to exist, because they lack modifiers.

All matter in the universe appears to be on the threshold of being real. Could this be the scientific application of
idealism or immaterialism? We're angling dangerously toward hippie talk, here.

*In this case, "zero" refers to the distance of the parabola from the asymptote (or of the curve of existence from reality), and not an absence of value or substance.



Next time: On time and eternal recurrence, in which I try to espouse one of the most important Nietzschean concepts that I don't actually believe.

Friday, June 4, 2010

On Events:

Required reading: Events, Space-time

Okay, last time, i had a look at my giant file of topics, and decided that my "space-time" entry was very short and not very informative. However, today, I found a way to work it into today's subject: events. However, it's still a bit off topic.
So, bear with me. This one's a double-post.

On space-time:

Space has three dimensions: width, length (or height), and depth. The resulting measure for how much space is occupied by something is volume. That measure is simply a way of quantifying what Spinoza called extension. It is the extension of substance into three dimensions. However, an object in space unmodified by time is incomplete. Not only do we need to quantify the spatial dimensions of a substance, but also the temporal dimensions. Not merely depth, width, and height, but also the when of that substance.

This want of a fourth dimension for the description of substance is likely one reason why many physicists believe in an amalgamation of the dimensions known as space-time. All that I have said about infinite space refers specifically to Euclidean and Newtonian absolute space. However, one key feature of space-time (which makes it differ from absolute Euclidean/Newtonian space) is that it appears to be warped by gravitational pulls. It is not clear what implications this has for the occupation of space by matter, but I think it indicates a mapping of objects in space as they are affected by gravity, as opposed to a boundary or a limited shape which space takes. It is the map of the path objects take through space and time (space-time), and not the shape of space-time itself. The normal method of determining spatial boundaries by their relation to other objects makes it all too easy to assume that a lack of objects indicates a lack of space.

On events:

Like the frames of a film, each object exists in space as its own event. Events are less happenings or objects themselves than they are bundles of detailed descriptive data. Events are composed of a what (a thing occupying space), a when (the duration, or point at which it will or did occur), and a how (an adverb and/or adjective) which provides an analytical description. For these purposes, an object is described as ‘the event of object (a)'s existence at location (l) at time (t), with attributes (a1, a2, a3, etc).’ For example, the rocket (what) travelled from the earth to the moon with a duration of Δt (distance over duration = speed), and the rocket was red.

That said, every event has an infinite number of potential (but necessary) descriptors to identify it as a unique event. These descriptors range from the ones I’ve just mentioned to the past, future, and relatively simultaneous events that occur everywhere else. That is to say, every event requires a description that accounts for every other event that is happening, has happened, and will happen in order to be unique. The upshot of a description that must account for every other possible or real event necessitates that every event is the same event, and not unique at all (because any one description describes all events, which all have the same description). There is only one event, in a broad sense, and that event spans the entirety of space-time which is infinite. Therefore, “The Event” is infinite, and inseparable from space-time (the universe), if not synonymous.

Obviously, such vast descriptions are more than what is required and sufficient for the identification of one event, and perceiving it as being different from another. It is as simple as making the arbitrary divisions that are normally made within an infinite medium. We divide finite events from within the infinite event, just as we make finite spaces of infinite space, and finite times of infinite time.

Being able to conceive of a group of finites as parts of one infinite whole requires that we reject, at least on a hypothetical level, the convenient assumption that difference of qualities/attributes is an indicator of individuality. We do not consider a pile of sugar to be something other than sugar. We do not consider one grain of sugar to be something other than sugar. Difference in size, shape, quantity, and– I would argue– even atomic structure, do not necessitate finiteness. Just as a human is made up of bones, blood, flesh, water, etc, the infinite universe is made up of an infinite number of objects and substances with different make-ups and attributes.



Next week: On asymptotes and matter, in which I try to stretch out a short post and hope you understand.