On Lying:

The best way to avoid being caught in a lie is to have nothing to lie about. The best way to keep a secret is to have no secrets to keep – alternatively, never, ever tell anyone.

Lies are a dangerous sin to commit because they threaten and distort perceived reality. To tell a lie and be believed is to convince the believer that what is real is unreal, or that the unreal is real. While a lie may never be found out, any unreal event housed within the real necessarily calls attention to itself by having no referent.

Because of the natural chain of events that is cause and effect (that same chain which necessitates that all events be the same infinite event), any false or unreal event introduced into that chain is easily traced backward to its source – the liar. A thorough, deductive investigation of the chain of events which led to the unreal event, will inevitably uncover the liar because the unreal event seems to have an inappropriate cause or no cause at all. In order to conceal a lie well, one must then concoct further lies which support it, masking the flaws in the chain of events.
Naturally, the more lies one tells, the more unlikely that the chain of real events will cohere with the lie, and then it will be discovered. However, some will not delve as deeply into the chain as others, leaving the lie to persist.

As such, there are cases where a lie cannot be easily discovered by deductive reasoning, and the person who believes it will continue to live as though the lie were true. This is dangerous, because it introduces a false or unreal event into the chain of future real events, such that the unreal event becomes a factor in determining what will be real in the future.

This is all not to mention the emotional effects of a lie. For the liar - if the liar is not a sociopath - there will nearly always be pangs of guilt for having told the lie, which may or may not be bearable. There is guilt for having lied, and further guilt for having done or been involved with whatever thing caused the lie. Even in cases where no guilt is felt, it is highly likely that the liar will experience paranoia with regard to being found out. 

For the person lied to, there is more often than not suspicion, and in such cases suspicion is sufficient cause for feelings of betrayal, regardless of whether those suspicions have been validated. If the lie is discovered, the feelings of betrayal and suspicion are validated, turning to anger, disappointment, and depression. This is before whatever truth that the lie replaced is discovered, and in some cases, the discover of the truth will cause further anguish.

As it is rarely advantageous to be the receptor of negative emotions (least of all, one’s own), it is rarely advantageous to lie. As stated, the lie is almost inevitably discovered, making the negative response and effects of altering the chain of events just as inevitable. In this sense, lies are in almost every case as much a self-destructive behaviour as they are an outwardly destructive behaviour.

Furthermore, the act of lying in conjunction with the true event which seemed to require the lie has an additive effect, which results in more negative response than would originally have been encountered were the event alone discovered. To an extent, this relationship mirrors western karmic theory, because in lying, negativity is visited back on the liar two-fold.

On faith, belief, and offense:

There is no injury to the non-believer in the believer’s continued belief. 

The positive statement “I believe in x, which is opposed to your views” is inoffensive. However, the statement “the belief in x is a false belief” is offensive, because it denies the potential verity of an unverifiable thing. While faith-based beliefs are unverifiable by nature, believing is a form of subjective truth, and to deny it is to call the believer a liar.

The point being that faith-based belief in a thing and faith-based non-belief in a thing are equally unverifiable, and as such, all faith-based beliefs or non-beliefs can co-exist logically, because blind faith is illogical in the first place. It is just as likely that an idea or object that is not readily apparent exists as it is that it doesn't, so long as it remains apparently not.

There is no contradiction in the simultaneous existence or non-existence of that which can not be proved or disproved with certainty. God may or may not exist just as unicorns or aliens may or may not exist. These things all possess potential for existence but lack any apparent evidence to that existence. That said, it is still illogical to assert belief in any such thing, because it is illogical to believe in anything that is not apparently so. Furthermore, it is illogical to believe in logical contradictions; absolutely non-existent objects, such as a round square or a highly populated desert isle.

There are three ways that people respond to the unverifiable: 

1. Blind acceptance, due to misrepresentation of the subject as having evidence of being absolutely true or false

2. Doubt or rejection of the subject as false in the face of such a misrepresentation

3. A rejection of the subject as a non-issue; as that which can not provide evidence of itself has no effect on the perceivable world, because it either does not exist or works in such a way as to be imperceptible or undiscovered. 

Obviously, the third response is the one that logic prefers, because blind acceptance as true and based on a lack of evidence is illogical, while doubt or rejection as false based on a lack of evidence is also a form of blind acceptance. To suspend judgment, to refuse to take a stance is most logical because it allows for existence or non existence, and places no particular value on either.

On challenging faith:

On the subject of using what is readily apparent as evidence of existence or non-existence, it would follow naturally that these principles be applied to issues of faith; whether it be faith in the existence of a thing, or faith in the non-existence of a thing.

It is unreasonable to provide a fully-formed antithesis to a faith-based thesis. (It is, of course, never reasonable to provide an unformed or partially formed anything). This is because that antithesis is as much a faith-based claim as the thesis, in that any evidence to its truth is based on the apparently not; something for which no evidence can be found. Countering a conclusion that is based on the not at all apparent with a conclusion that is based on the apparently not provides no evidence to the truth of one’s own assertion, and as such cannot disprove the opposite.

Simply, to state “your faith-based claim is false” is no more or less verifiable than to state “my faith-based claim is true.” Those who make conclusions based on the apparently not are effectively making a claim based on their own blind faith that what cannot be seen does not exist.

Conversely, it is just so that those who make conclusions based on the apparently so have faith that what they perceive is what is real – but, importantly, the perceivable world is an integral part of interaction and existence in the world, real or not. That is, it is not blind faith, as it is in the other two cases.

The application of this discourse is that in discussion about religion, outspoken atheism is as much a blind faith-based belief as theism. So, for those who would prefer to avoid blind faith in anything (which, as I have said is the most logical approach to belief) a careful agnosticism – with an open mind to emerging evidence - is the only option.



I have lots more to say about what's wrong with atheism, like its name, for example. We'll see what I do next time.

On the readily apparent as evidence of existence or non-existence:

Required Reading: Philosophy of Perception; Epistemology

While denying sense data is impractical, it would be equally impractical to deny the existence of a potential object or even a fantastic object when there is evidence to support it or when there is no evidence to the contrary. This is the basis of what I will call healthy scepticism.

Healthy scepticism is to be distinguished from unhealthy scepticism by the fact that it does not deny what is readily apparent. In order to illustrate unhealthy scepticism, I refer to a legend of an early sceptic, who upon adopting scepticism of even what is readily apparent was killed by a cart when he walked in front of it, disbelieving its existence. Conversely, healthy scepticism operates upon the assumption (but not the certainty) that what is readily apparent is evidence to its own existence by its being apparent in the first place. I say that it does not operate on a certainty because, while it is impractical to disbelieve what is readily apparent, it is equally impractical to believe that what is readily apparent is objective truth (more on that another time). 

Likewise, it is illogical to believe in what is not readily apparent, or in what is apparently not. The former - what is not readily apparent - is merely name given to the potential for either existence or non-existence, while the latter - the apparently not - is made readily apparent by the absence of evidence and cannot be verified by any available means.

What is not readily apparent cannot be used as substantive evidence for the existence or potential existence of anything. Only what is within the immediate reach of human experience is readily apparent, and effective in evidencing the existence of a thing.

In cases where something is not readily apparent, it is best to reserve judgment (as I may yet argue is best in all cases), however it is not within human capacity to continue to be active in life without behaving as though what is apparent is real, and what is not immediately apparent could be real – regardless of whether it is believed true. That said, one should neither believe that the apparently not is categorically true or false either. Even so, reaction or no reaction to a lack of stimuli is not required for active life.

Next Week: We'll see...

...

On what is readily apparent:

Having explained the infinite thing at length - a thing not readily apparent (and indeed, not likely perceivable) - it strikes me that it is necessary to illustrate what is not apparent by explaining its application to what is readily apparent; what is perceivable.

All that is ‘given’ to the perceptual doors (the senses), and is readily apparent without the aid of tools or theoretical equations, lies within the world or realm of perception. These are empirical perceptions. What is perceivable is shared to varying degrees by all sensitive humans. Anything that is perceived by one person can, under the similar circumstances be perceived by another person (for there can be no same circumstances). While we can’t quantify the perceptions of others, the acknowledgement of shared sensations allows for inferred empirical perception.

Generally, what is readily apparent is that which has the capacity to be discovered by human means, through the senses, or with tools (like a microscope). It is impractical to deny what is readily apparent, as that would deny the senses, which in turn would deny the realness of the real.

There are two ways of being readily apparent. Something can be apparently so, and apparently not. Both are readily apparent, but the latter can be used as evidence of existence, while the latter can be used as evidence of non-existence.

Next time: On the readily apparent as evidence of existence or non-existence, in which I explain
the concept of 'healthy scepticism.'

Conclusions on Eternal Recurrence:

Required reading: Eternal recurrence, eternal recurrence vs. infinite events

Obviously, because common interpretations of eternal recurrence don’t consider there to be infinite events, no proponent thereof makes any attempt to reconcile the two. Why should they? There is no empirical evidence that events are infinite (my a priori proofs that space and time, and therefore events are infinite are not empirical, obviously). My best attempt at reconciling the two is to take the expression ‘history repeats itself’ seriously.

While I cannot admit that any event can be the same as another without occurring at the same time, I can admit that some events are so similar as to indicate a loose concept of sameness (but not true identity). For example, the method in which I brush my teeth is generally the same across time. I brush them in a certain way, at a certain time of day, and it takes about the same amount of time every time. There will be deviations in certain circumstances, but it would not be inaccurate to argue that the history of my tooth brushing has repeated itself so often as to produce at least two events that are essentially the same apart from the time at which it occurred (from my human perspective). There is more to eternal recurrence theory that cannot be accounted for in that interpretation, however.

While Nietzsche didn’t believe that explanation, it is believed by Walter Kaufmann - a frequent translator and editor of his work - that eternal recurrence as Nietzsche conceived of it may have been derived from the works of Heinrich Heine, who wrote

“[T]ime is infinite, but the things in time, the concrete bodies, are finite. They may indeed disperse into the smallest particles; but these particles, the atoms, have their determinate numbers, and the numbers of the configurations which, all of themselves, are formed out of them is also determinate. Now, however long a time may pass, according to the eternal laws governing the combinations of this eternal play of repetition, all configurations which have previously existed on this earth must yet meet, attract, repulse, kiss, and corrupt each other again...” [my emphasis]

My reading of this quote seems to cohere well with the ideas I’ve been explaining since the beginning: the infinite has finite parts, and following from that, infinite time yields an infinite number of finite events, or, in a much broader sense, one infinite event.

Heine’s description of repulsion, kissing, and corruption is nice and flexible. It doesn’t say explicitly imply exact repetition, rather, it is a more poetic way of saying “stuff interacts and interrelates, and will continue to do so, in much the same way as it always has,” wherein “stuff” refers to events and event-objects.

Next Week: I don't know. We'll see, huh? I've sort of run out of steam in terms of the logical progression of this philosophy. It looks like the next big topic will be death-related! Exciiiting!

Eternal recurrence vs. Infinite events:

Required Reading: Eternal Recurrence,Time's Arrow

[Note: This used to be a longer essay (by blog standards), so I've cut it in two. Stay tuned for the second half next week, and may your existential concerns about the inexplicable and irreconcilable be assuaged at some point.]

The most common interpretation of eternal recurrence is flawed in that it assumes that there are a finite number of events within an infinite time. (It is assumed of eternal recurrence that events must recur the same way ad infinitum because there are a finite number of events within infinite time). This is not possible, because infinite time entails infinite events. It is already established that identity of events depends, particularly in cases of the most complex events, almost intrinsically on the time at which the event occurred. The more time there is, the more events there must be. If time is endless, the number of finite events throughout time must also be endless.

There are, I believe, an infinite number of events, objects, non-objects, and object-events housed within infinite space (I know that such a wording implies the finite. Just roll with it). As such, the universe and time as we know them cannot recur in exactly the same way because:

(a) time has no end, and therefore each event, no matter how similar is unique due to its having to have occurred at some point within the infinite; 

(b) time’s arrow denies the possibility that events could recur in the same way, because additional variables affect the universe ad infinitum (read: there is no limit to progress);

(c) the universe is in a state of constant flux. For the most part, this is because of (a).

However, as I write this, I can conceive of possible refutes that will need to be explored:

1. Identity of events with reference to placement on a timeline depends on an arbitrary conception of time as having units. Infinite time, as I have stated, is infinitely divisible, but is also an infinite unity. One cannot divide infinite time into two times, there is but one time, in which arbitrary divisions are imposed, but they are not true divisions. This suggests that what would commonly be referenced as time1 cannot be distinguished from time2, because it is part of a unity. As the increments imposed upon time are a man-made conception, the idea of one time following another is also a human conception, and as time is a unity, it is entirely reasonable to assert that all events as we perceive them are simultaneous – that is, one infinite (and infinitely divisible) time, in which one infinite (and infinitely divisible) event occurs. That said, the infinite event is infinitely divisible into finite increments, just as time is, which allows us the illusion of unique events. In all, though, this argument does not fully refute my initial argument, as the infinite nature of both time and the event preclude any definitive start or end point at which events can recur.

2. It is commonly theorized and/or prophesied that earthly (a very limited scope, in terms of universe, by the way) progress has reached - and will on several future occasions – reach points of stagnation and even regression. Arnold J. Toynbee, for example theorized that a human over-focus on the successes of the past will create stagnation by leaving humans unprepared to deal with future problems. The point being both that human progress is limited to the availability of those resources to them, and that past and future projections of technological stagnation are an example of the way in which eternal recurrence can be interpreted more loosely as ‘history repeating itself.’ It is not necessarily the case, however, that progress cannot occur after or even during a period of stagnation, to reach or overcome the level it had been at prior to that period. Likewise, as stated in (a) and noted in (1), identity of events does not allow for history to repeat itself exactly, as eternal recurrence would require. That is to say that eternal recurrence, as it is commonly conceived, cannot be possible if there are an infinite number of unique events.

Next Week: Conclusions on Eternal Recurrence, in which I provide a bit of denouement on this issue, and uneasily put it to bed.