Suicide, death, and the destruction of the world:

Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s Cat’s Cradle illustrates through Bokononism the idea that one’s concept of the world is limited to the experiences of the individual, and not based on a real-world objective reality. When Bokononists commit suicide, they say “Now I will destroy the whole world.” This refers to the fact that by committing suicide, the whole world from the perspective of one’s self is destroyed. In being born, one creates the world (insofar as the fact that despite the propaganda, we are all biased toward a self-centred world-view because of the problem of other minds). In suicide, one destroys the world.

I should note here, that I'm not talking about subjective idealism, but rather, an individualist frame of mind in which the universe's beginning and end relative to one's own experience is equal to birth and death.

As I have written in earlier works, suicide is an act, merely an event. There is intention, there is movement in it.

An alternative reading is that when one thing changes all things are changed in totality. This is a challenge to common conceptions of conservation of identity. For example, in death, one’s consciousness leaves this world, and the result is a changed and remade world. If one conceives of the universe as a unity, then the removal or addition of any part is a complete remaking; a complete destruction and reconstruction.

Every individual’s own birth and death is their own personal experience of world destruction and remaking. (Granted, if the Universe is an infinite unity, nothing can ever be truly added or removed from it, but that is not to say that its contents cannot be rearranged).

The universe is, of course, in a state of constant flux, and committing suicide is a conscious way of taking control of that constant change. It is exerting the will in such a way as to cause a remaking of the universe that is free of you. However, this is neglectful of one’s responsibility to remain in the world, and use the will to exact smaller changes than killing oneself. Using the will to remove one’s own will is counter-intuitive.

On the experience of death and dying:

“Every one regardeth dying as a great matter: but as yet death is not a festival.”

- Friedrich Nietzsche

The claim that every man dies alone is accurate in as much as none but he who is dying can experience it. While a person can die surrounded by family and friends, the experience of that death cannot be shared with anybody – not even those who are dying simultaneously. The death of each person is their own to experience, and each is intrinsically unique by virtue of the individuality of each human being.

Heidegger suggests that death is not even available as an experience, because experience requires life. I do not presume to suggest that death is the end of all experience, but Heidegger’s position underlines the uncompromising finality of death in terms of experience and sharing that experience with others.

In death, none can recount that experience to the living. Even as we lie on our death beds explaining the experience to others, those others have only the experience of our death from their perspective. More accurately, others have the experience of watching someone dying; the process and not the result.

To further that idea of sharing in dying, Heidegger represented dying as what really matters, rather than death (by virtue of its possibility for experience), going so far as to point out that the process of living is synonymous with the process of dying, saying that as soon as we are born, we are old enough to die. This is what he called being-towards-death.

From this perspective, it is necessary to orient oneself towards death such that dying is an emotional investment in possible ways of being; one with a necessary agency and awareness – an authentic way of being-toward-death (note that ‘dying’ is the same as living, by this interpretation). More on this later.

As I said, dying and life cannot be mutual, identical experiences between individuals. Each person’s death and dying are his or her ownmost experience, but through reflection, communication, and shared experience – a state of what I call intersubjectivity - the living can share in a facsimile of another’s life, albeit a flawed and incomplete one.

“To many men life is a failure; a poison-worm gnaweth at their heart. Then let them see to it that their dying is all the more a success.” - Friedrich Nietzsche

**I should probably note that those Nietzsche quotes were taken out of context and I'm using them in a tongue-in-cheek sort of way to illustrate my points.**

Conclusions on Eternal Recurrence:

Required reading: Eternal recurrence, eternal recurrence vs. infinite events

Obviously, because common interpretations of eternal recurrence don’t consider there to be infinite events, no proponent thereof makes any attempt to reconcile the two. Why should they? There is no empirical evidence that events are infinite (my a priori proofs that space and time, and therefore events are infinite are not empirical, obviously). My best attempt at reconciling the two is to take the expression ‘history repeats itself’ seriously.

While I cannot admit that any event can be the same as another without occurring at the same time, I can admit that some events are so similar as to indicate a loose concept of sameness (but not true identity). For example, the method in which I brush my teeth is generally the same across time. I brush them in a certain way, at a certain time of day, and it takes about the same amount of time every time. There will be deviations in certain circumstances, but it would not be inaccurate to argue that the history of my tooth brushing has repeated itself so often as to produce at least two events that are essentially the same apart from the time at which it occurred (from my human perspective). There is more to eternal recurrence theory that cannot be accounted for in that interpretation, however.

While Nietzsche didn’t believe that explanation, it is believed by Walter Kaufmann - a frequent translator and editor of his work - that eternal recurrence as Nietzsche conceived of it may have been derived from the works of Heinrich Heine, who wrote

“[T]ime is infinite, but the things in time, the concrete bodies, are finite. They may indeed disperse into the smallest particles; but these particles, the atoms, have their determinate numbers, and the numbers of the configurations which, all of themselves, are formed out of them is also determinate. Now, however long a time may pass, according to the eternal laws governing the combinations of this eternal play of repetition, all configurations which have previously existed on this earth must yet meet, attract, repulse, kiss, and corrupt each other again...” [my emphasis]

My reading of this quote seems to cohere well with the ideas I’ve been explaining since the beginning: the infinite has finite parts, and following from that, infinite time yields an infinite number of finite events, or, in a much broader sense, one infinite event.

Heine’s description of repulsion, kissing, and corruption is nice and flexible. It doesn’t say explicitly imply exact repetition, rather, it is a more poetic way of saying “stuff interacts and interrelates, and will continue to do so, in much the same way as it always has,” wherein “stuff” refers to events and event-objects.

Next Week: I don't know. We'll see, huh? I've sort of run out of steam in terms of the logical progression of this philosophy. It looks like the next big topic will be death-related! Exciiiting!

Eternal recurrence vs. Infinite events:

Required Reading: Eternal Recurrence,Time's Arrow

[Note: This used to be a longer essay (by blog standards), so I've cut it in two. Stay tuned for the second half next week, and may your existential concerns about the inexplicable and irreconcilable be assuaged at some point.]

The most common interpretation of eternal recurrence is flawed in that it assumes that there are a finite number of events within an infinite time. (It is assumed of eternal recurrence that events must recur the same way ad infinitum because there are a finite number of events within infinite time). This is not possible, because infinite time entails infinite events. It is already established that identity of events depends, particularly in cases of the most complex events, almost intrinsically on the time at which the event occurred. The more time there is, the more events there must be. If time is endless, the number of finite events throughout time must also be endless.

There are, I believe, an infinite number of events, objects, non-objects, and object-events housed within infinite space (I know that such a wording implies the finite. Just roll with it). As such, the universe and time as we know them cannot recur in exactly the same way because:

(a) time has no end, and therefore each event, no matter how similar is unique due to its having to have occurred at some point within the infinite; 

(b) time’s arrow denies the possibility that events could recur in the same way, because additional variables affect the universe ad infinitum (read: there is no limit to progress);

(c) the universe is in a state of constant flux. For the most part, this is because of (a).

However, as I write this, I can conceive of possible refutes that will need to be explored:

1. Identity of events with reference to placement on a timeline depends on an arbitrary conception of time as having units. Infinite time, as I have stated, is infinitely divisible, but is also an infinite unity. One cannot divide infinite time into two times, there is but one time, in which arbitrary divisions are imposed, but they are not true divisions. This suggests that what would commonly be referenced as time1 cannot be distinguished from time2, because it is part of a unity. As the increments imposed upon time are a man-made conception, the idea of one time following another is also a human conception, and as time is a unity, it is entirely reasonable to assert that all events as we perceive them are simultaneous – that is, one infinite (and infinitely divisible) time, in which one infinite (and infinitely divisible) event occurs. That said, the infinite event is infinitely divisible into finite increments, just as time is, which allows us the illusion of unique events. In all, though, this argument does not fully refute my initial argument, as the infinite nature of both time and the event preclude any definitive start or end point at which events can recur.

2. It is commonly theorized and/or prophesied that earthly (a very limited scope, in terms of universe, by the way) progress has reached - and will on several future occasions – reach points of stagnation and even regression. Arnold J. Toynbee, for example theorized that a human over-focus on the successes of the past will create stagnation by leaving humans unprepared to deal with future problems. The point being both that human progress is limited to the availability of those resources to them, and that past and future projections of technological stagnation are an example of the way in which eternal recurrence can be interpreted more loosely as ‘history repeating itself.’ It is not necessarily the case, however, that progress cannot occur after or even during a period of stagnation, to reach or overcome the level it had been at prior to that period. Likewise, as stated in (a) and noted in (1), identity of events does not allow for history to repeat itself exactly, as eternal recurrence would require. That is to say that eternal recurrence, as it is commonly conceived, cannot be possible if there are an infinite number of unique events.

Next Week: Conclusions on Eternal Recurrence, in which I provide a bit of denouement on this issue, and uneasily put it to bed.

On time and eternal recurrence:

Required Reading: Eternal Recurrence, Linear and Cyclical Time

Eternal recurrence is a concept derived from Nietzsche. It was unfortunately underdeveloped because the most complete description of it is found in a collection of notes titled The Will to Power, which was released (and liberally edited) posthumously by his sister. As such, followers of Nietzsche have attempted to interpret and disentangle the concept in a faithful way, based on prototypical appearances in earlier works and the fragments found in the notes – an effort made difficult by the vagueness and sometimes contradictory nature of those mentions.

The premise of the theory is that all events (and the objects and beings involved), recur in exactly the same way an infinite number of times. In eternal recurrence time is cyclical rather than linear. All bodies and events will occur again in exactly the same way an infinite number of times because the past and future are practically the same as the present, due to the uniformity of the cycle.

Because it is the most familiar analogue, many seek to liken eternal recurrence with reincarnation. This is not the case in any familiar way. In Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, it is not a new life lived and there is no retention of prior consciousness (though, there is little information provided, with respect to that angle of approach).

Nietzsche used eternal recurrence as a way of showing that life-acceptance was important, in contrast with looking toward some future reward in a promised afterlife at the expense of putting any value into this life. He called this self-acceptance amor fati, or ‘love of fate.’ The problem, however, is that the frame of reference for what is past and what is future is always based in the present – which I have shown to be elusive and asymptotic.

While both Nietzsche and I assume infinite time, his cyclic time incorrectly assumes a finite number of events - an assumption that makes it difficult to reconcile eternal recurrence with the idea of the infinite thing. Despite the admission that all things are finite divisions within the infinite, forgetting that the number of finite divisions is infinite causes many problems.



Next Week: Eternal recurrence vs. Infinite events, in which I make a rather lengthy attempt to address the issues involved in reconciling the one with the other. (It may end up being a two-parter).