Suicide, death, and the destruction of the world:

Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s Cat’s Cradle illustrates through Bokononism the idea that one’s concept of the world is limited to the experiences of the individual, and not based on a real-world objective reality. When Bokononists commit suicide, they say “Now I will destroy the whole world.” This refers to the fact that by committing suicide, the whole world from the perspective of one’s self is destroyed. In being born, one creates the world (insofar as the fact that despite the propaganda, we are all biased toward a self-centred world-view because of the problem of other minds). In suicide, one destroys the world.

I should note here, that I'm not talking about subjective idealism, but rather, an individualist frame of mind in which the universe's beginning and end relative to one's own experience is equal to birth and death.

As I have written in earlier works, suicide is an act, merely an event. There is intention, there is movement in it.

An alternative reading is that when one thing changes all things are changed in totality. This is a challenge to common conceptions of conservation of identity. For example, in death, one’s consciousness leaves this world, and the result is a changed and remade world. If one conceives of the universe as a unity, then the removal or addition of any part is a complete remaking; a complete destruction and reconstruction.

Every individual’s own birth and death is their own personal experience of world destruction and remaking. (Granted, if the Universe is an infinite unity, nothing can ever be truly added or removed from it, but that is not to say that its contents cannot be rearranged).

The universe is, of course, in a state of constant flux, and committing suicide is a conscious way of taking control of that constant change. It is exerting the will in such a way as to cause a remaking of the universe that is free of you. However, this is neglectful of one’s responsibility to remain in the world, and use the will to exact smaller changes than killing oneself. Using the will to remove one’s own will is counter-intuitive.

Eternal recurrence vs. Infinite events:

Required Reading: Eternal Recurrence,Time's Arrow

[Note: This used to be a longer essay (by blog standards), so I've cut it in two. Stay tuned for the second half next week, and may your existential concerns about the inexplicable and irreconcilable be assuaged at some point.]

The most common interpretation of eternal recurrence is flawed in that it assumes that there are a finite number of events within an infinite time. (It is assumed of eternal recurrence that events must recur the same way ad infinitum because there are a finite number of events within infinite time). This is not possible, because infinite time entails infinite events. It is already established that identity of events depends, particularly in cases of the most complex events, almost intrinsically on the time at which the event occurred. The more time there is, the more events there must be. If time is endless, the number of finite events throughout time must also be endless.

There are, I believe, an infinite number of events, objects, non-objects, and object-events housed within infinite space (I know that such a wording implies the finite. Just roll with it). As such, the universe and time as we know them cannot recur in exactly the same way because:

(a) time has no end, and therefore each event, no matter how similar is unique due to its having to have occurred at some point within the infinite; 

(b) time’s arrow denies the possibility that events could recur in the same way, because additional variables affect the universe ad infinitum (read: there is no limit to progress);

(c) the universe is in a state of constant flux. For the most part, this is because of (a).

However, as I write this, I can conceive of possible refutes that will need to be explored:

1. Identity of events with reference to placement on a timeline depends on an arbitrary conception of time as having units. Infinite time, as I have stated, is infinitely divisible, but is also an infinite unity. One cannot divide infinite time into two times, there is but one time, in which arbitrary divisions are imposed, but they are not true divisions. This suggests that what would commonly be referenced as time1 cannot be distinguished from time2, because it is part of a unity. As the increments imposed upon time are a man-made conception, the idea of one time following another is also a human conception, and as time is a unity, it is entirely reasonable to assert that all events as we perceive them are simultaneous – that is, one infinite (and infinitely divisible) time, in which one infinite (and infinitely divisible) event occurs. That said, the infinite event is infinitely divisible into finite increments, just as time is, which allows us the illusion of unique events. In all, though, this argument does not fully refute my initial argument, as the infinite nature of both time and the event preclude any definitive start or end point at which events can recur.

2. It is commonly theorized and/or prophesied that earthly (a very limited scope, in terms of universe, by the way) progress has reached - and will on several future occasions – reach points of stagnation and even regression. Arnold J. Toynbee, for example theorized that a human over-focus on the successes of the past will create stagnation by leaving humans unprepared to deal with future problems. The point being both that human progress is limited to the availability of those resources to them, and that past and future projections of technological stagnation are an example of the way in which eternal recurrence can be interpreted more loosely as ‘history repeating itself.’ It is not necessarily the case, however, that progress cannot occur after or even during a period of stagnation, to reach or overcome the level it had been at prior to that period. Likewise, as stated in (a) and noted in (1), identity of events does not allow for history to repeat itself exactly, as eternal recurrence would require. That is to say that eternal recurrence, as it is commonly conceived, cannot be possible if there are an infinite number of unique events.

Next Week: Conclusions on Eternal Recurrence, in which I provide a bit of denouement on this issue, and uneasily put it to bed.

On Asymptotes and Matter:

Required reading: Asymptotes, On Events, On the paradox of infinite divisibility

"Approaching zero" refers to a mathematical concept involving parabolas and curves. An asymptote is a theoretical line which the curve always approaches, but never intersects with, such that if the line were to have a value of zero*, the curve would always approach, but never reach it. Similarly, nearly every quality or attribute has the capacity to “approach zero,” but never reach it.

Asymptotes in parabolic mathematics are examples of how infinite divisibility is a universal trait in a real-world context. The curve never reaches zero because it is dividing the space between the two infinitely. Metaphorically speaking, human experience is the curve, while exact time or exact location is the asymptote. Our curve of experience naturally approaches an exact time or an exact space, but never meets it.

The asymptotic nature of matter (and time) in conjunction with infinite divisibility necessitates that no one particle of matter (or time) can be truly pinpointed. The problem is that it appears as though experience approaches empirical (or objective) reality, but never reaches it. The evidence of reality is made so transitory by its divisibility. The result is that existence and infinite divisibility seem to imply non-existence by the impossibility of making true “this object exists at location x at time t.” This is to say that events/objects cannot be said to exist, because they lack modifiers.

All matter in the universe appears to be on the threshold of being real. Could this be the scientific application of idealism or immaterialism? We're angling dangerously toward hippie talk, here.

*In this case, "zero" refers to the distance of the parabola from the asymptote (or of the curve of existence from reality), and not an absence of value or substance.



Next time: On time and eternal recurrence, in which I try to espouse one of the most important Nietzschean concepts that I don't actually believe.

On Events:

Required reading: Events, Space-time

Okay, last time, i had a look at my giant file of topics, and decided that my "space-time" entry was very short and not very informative. However, today, I found a way to work it into today's subject: events. However, it's still a bit off topic.
So, bear with me. This one's a double-post.

On space-time:

Space has three dimensions: width, length (or height), and depth. The resulting measure for how much space is occupied by something is volume. That measure is simply a way of quantifying what Spinoza called extension. It is the extension of substance into three dimensions. However, an object in space unmodified by time is incomplete. Not only do we need to quantify the spatial dimensions of a substance, but also the temporal dimensions. Not merely depth, width, and height, but also the when of that substance.

This want of a fourth dimension for the description of substance is likely one reason why many physicists believe in an amalgamation of the dimensions known as space-time. All that I have said about infinite space refers specifically to Euclidean and Newtonian absolute space. However, one key feature of space-time (which makes it differ from absolute Euclidean/Newtonian space) is that it appears to be warped by gravitational pulls. It is not clear what implications this has for the occupation of space by matter, but I think it indicates a mapping of objects in space as they are affected by gravity, as opposed to a boundary or a limited shape which space takes. It is the map of the path objects take through space and time (space-time), and not the shape of space-time itself. The normal method of determining spatial boundaries by their relation to other objects makes it all too easy to assume that a lack of objects indicates a lack of space.

On events:

Like the frames of a film, each object exists in space as its own event. Events are less happenings or objects themselves than they are bundles of detailed descriptive data. Events are composed of a what (a thing occupying space), a when (the duration, or point at which it will or did occur), and a how (an adverb and/or adjective) which provides an analytical description. For these purposes, an object is described as ‘the event of object (a)'s existence at location (l) at time (t), with attributes (a1, a2, a3, etc).’ For example, the rocket (what) travelled from the earth to the moon with a duration of Δt (distance over duration = speed), and the rocket was red.

That said, every event has an infinite number of potential (but necessary) descriptors to identify it as a unique event. These descriptors range from the ones I’ve just mentioned to the past, future, and relatively simultaneous events that occur everywhere else. That is to say, every event requires a description that accounts for every other event that is happening, has happened, and will happen in order to be unique. The upshot of a description that must account for every other possible or real event necessitates that every event is the same event, and not unique at all (because any one description describes all events, which all have the same description). There is only one event, in a broad sense, and that event spans the entirety of space-time which is infinite. Therefore, “The Event” is infinite, and inseparable from space-time (the universe), if not synonymous.

Obviously, such vast descriptions are more than what is required and sufficient for the identification of one event, and perceiving it as being different from another. It is as simple as making the arbitrary divisions that are normally made within an infinite medium. We divide finite events from within the infinite event, just as we make finite spaces of infinite space, and finite times of infinite time.

Being able to conceive of a group of finites as parts of one infinite whole requires that we reject, at least on a hypothetical level, the convenient assumption that difference of qualities/attributes is an indicator of individuality. We do not consider a pile of sugar to be something other than sugar. We do not consider one grain of sugar to be something other than sugar. Difference in size, shape, quantity, and– I would argue– even atomic structure, do not necessitate finiteness. Just as a human is made up of bones, blood, flesh, water, etc, the infinite universe is made up of an infinite number of objects and substances with different make-ups and attributes.



Next week: On asymptotes and matter, in which I try to stretch out a short post and hope you understand.

On Spinoza and the infinite thing:

Required Reading: Spinoza's Metaphysics, Omnipresence, Religion and the infinite thing, Naturalistic Pantheism

The idea of a God that is synonymous with universe mirrors the description of God that is laid out in 17th century Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics. In it, he frequently used the phrase “God or nature,” rather than merely "God" or "Nature" indicating that the two are essentially the same. (It’s worth noting here, that Spinoza was a Portuguese Jew, and not so much concerned with worries that the Catholic church might call him a heretic). Additionally, in the Ethics, God or nature (the infinite thing) has an infinite number of attributes or properties, two of which are Extension and Thought.

Extension in Spinoza's Ethics is analogous with my description of absolute space. Objects (which are known in these circles as ‘substance’) occupy space; that is, they are extended in space in terms of width, height, length, depth, etc. Spinoza described the differences perceived between those objects (substance) as being Modes – modifications of substance. So, in the context of the concepts that have previously been explained, these modes are what I have been calling "finite divisions" within the infinite thing. That which makes a hammer different from a salad is a mode. That which makes those objects perceivable at all is their extension, which is itself an attribute of the infinite thing.

If God is the same thing as the universe or nature – one infinite thing, and extension and thought are attributes thereof, it follows that human beings and all other living and non-living things are modes. The implication is that humans are not separate from god. In fact, humans are not truly separate from anything at all. The distance and separation we normally imagine between ourselves and god (up there), or ourselves and universe (out there), is an illusion. Neither a universe which surrounds us (readily apparent), nor a god which is ubiquitous (perhaps less apparent) is truly beyond our reach – and they are not at all separate from one another.



Next Week: On events, in which I explain the nature of events, and their relation to this whole ... thing.

On religion and the infinite thing:

Required reading: On God as Infinite, On the Identity of the Infinite, Omnipresence, Pantheism, Panentheism

Because we are assuming that God, space, and time are one and the same, the claim that the universe (of which space and time are facets) is the infinite thing does not exclude god from existence or infinity.

As I have already said, God, space, time, events and the universe are all the same thing. It is perfectly reasonable to call that infinite thing whatever one wants, but it is unreasonable to suggest that its components are different or separate if they are each described as infinite – a quality which precludes multiplicity.

The question is then “what is the significance of a god that is the same thing as the universe?” My answer is “no more significance than usual.” Certainly, it will affect the Judeo-Christian interpretation of God as being the benevolent man who lives on a cloud (which has already lost much of its credence), but it need not affect the truly spiritual aspect of any religion.

A conception of God as ubiquitous is found in many religions and approaches to spirituality, such as Taoism or Gaia theory (both forms of pantheism). However, the idea of an omnipresent god has faded from western religion, while it is far more common in the east. Ubiquity need not damage theistic religions – including Christianity, in any case.

Space and time are the building blocks of physics, and God is synonymous with them. As such, the implications for both prayer and science are numerous. The power of prayer to influence events is easier to imagine, considering the interconnectedness of people, their minds, their wills, events, and the forces behind them. Meanwhile scientific advancement and experimental pursuits could be considered holy events.

That said, it is my position that if God is one with the universe – the infinite thing – then prayer and worship are virtually redundant. The delivery system for matters of faith is instantaneous and ubiquitous. The mundane would be divine; holiness would reside within all things. God would no longer be beyond reach; no longer distanced from us.

However, it is up to each person to decide how to respond to this hypothesis. It would be as valid to venerate all things as it would to continue worship the same as always. Of course, for some, the question of whether worshipping rocks, supernovas, serial killers, and cheese - for each of these things is of God/the universe/the infinite thing – will seem a bit superfluous. So far as atheists are concerned, this issue would have no relevance.



Next Week: On Spinoza and the infinite thing, in which I explain how this "infinite thing" and its ubiquity relate to the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, for whom I have a philosophical boner.

On the identity of the infinite:

Required reading: Identity, infinity, holism, On God as Infinite

No two things can be infinite. That which is infinite is all that there is, by definition. If space is infinite, then God cannot also be infinite. If it is the case that God exists, then God must be infinite in accordance with Anselm’s ontological argument.

So, with those statements in mind, it appears that
a) nothing is infinite
b) only one thing is infinite and all others are not
or
c) that all of the things we believe to be infinite are one and the same thing.

Based on my earlier arguments, it would be counterproductive to choose (a). In selecting (b) we must assume that both time and space are finite, and god does exist, or that either time or space is infinite (but not both) and god does not exist. In selecting (c) we must assume that god, space, and time are all infinite, and the same infinite thing. In fact, given that (c) makes the many into one, we can now also accept (b), which is always true of the infinite by nature.

So, any thing that is infinite is the same thing as whatever else is infinite, and “the thing than which nothing greater can be thought” must be something even greater than what is normally thought of. To clarify: while god is defined as the thing than which nothing greater can be thought, common conceptions of god do not also include the descriptions of space and time. But, here I am claiming that god is space and time; that space and time are god.

Space and time, meanwhile, are the medium in which our physical experiences are built. The greatest physical thing that can be thought of is the universe; a structure encompassing space (which includes matter), time, and also energy. I posit that the universe is synonymous with the infinite thing. Indeed, the word universe means “all in one.” While the universe is typically a physical thing, it extends into the non-physical through time, the laws of physics, thought, and – for the sake of inclusiveness - the spiritual. Each of these affects, and is affected by the physical.



Next Week: On religion and the infinite thing, in which I hypothesize what it means for god to be synonymous with universe.